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A security policy describes the security requirements for a system.
A security model is a way of formalizing security policies.
Two paradigms:
◮ access control: a guard controls whether a principal (the
subject) is allowed access to a resource (the object).
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◮ information ﬂow control: dual notion sometimes used when
conﬁdentiality is the primary concern. A guard controls
whether information may ﬂow from a resource to a principal.
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◮ We can consider some fundamental access modes. Typically:
observe examine contents of an object
alter change contents of an object
◮ Next we deﬁne access rights and their proﬁles:
exec read append write
observe X X
alter X X
These are the access rights of the inﬂuential Bell-LaPadula
(BLP) model. Access rights are the model’s level of
granularity for deﬁning security policy. Each real operation
requires particular access rights.
◮ The proﬁles shown (and names of rights) diﬀer between
systems, and even between diﬀerent kinds of subject on the
same system. E.g., some systems have a delete. In Unix, exec
for directories indicates limited ability to read the directory.Ownership and identity
◮ Who may set the security policy? A resource may have a
owner who controls access on a case-by-case basis, or the
resource may be controlled by a uniform system-wide policy.
discretionary access control (DAC): owners decide
mandatory access control (MAC): policy set system-wide
Some mixture of these may apply, depending on the object
concerned.
◮ Owners of resources typically appear as principals in the
system: subjects themselves subject to access controls. BLP
does not (directly) take into account operations for
modiﬁcation of access controls (like chown in Windows NT),
nor explain when such operations are safe.
◮ The identity of subjects is also ﬂexible: sometimes we want
identity changes during operations, e.g., assigning identities to
executing programs (SUID programs in Unix). Again, this
doesn’t ﬁt BLP.Access control structures
◮ How are access control rights deﬁned? Many diﬀerent
schemes, but ultimately can be modelled thus:
◮ A set S of subjects, a set O of objects
◮ A set A of operations (modelled by access rights), we’ll
consider A = {exec,read,append,write}.
◮ An access control matrix
M = (Mso)s∈S,o∈O
where each entry Mso ⊆ A deﬁnes rights for s to access o.
◮ Example matrix for S = {Alice,Bob} and three objects:
bob.doc edit.exe fun.com
Alice {} {exec} {exec,read}
Bob {read,write} {exec} {exec,read,write}Representing access control matrix
◮ Implementing M directly is impractical, so diﬀerent schemes
are used. Two complementary possibilities, either using
capabilities (store M by rows) or using access control lists
(store M by columns)
◮ A capability is an unforgeable token that speciﬁes a subject’s
access rights. Pros: can pass around capabilities; good ﬁt
with discr. AC. Cons: diﬃcult to revoke, or ﬁnd out who has,
access to a particular resource (must examine all capabilities).
Interest reinstated recently with distributed and mobile
computation.
◮ An access control list (ACL) stores the access rights to an
object with the object itself. Pros: good ﬁt with object-biased
OSes. Cons: diﬃcult to revoke, or ﬁnd out, permissions of a
particular subject (must search all ACLs).Intermediate controls
Apart from subject-biased or object-biased representation of access
control policy, there are many mechanisms using intermediate
layers:
◮ Groups: assign subjects to one or more groups, and deﬁne
common permissions group-wise. (e.g., Unix ACL is perms for
subject, group, other).
◮ Negative permissions: often a natural way of deﬁning the
security policy, to say who should not have access to some
resource. A negative permission may override a permission
obtained from a group permission, for example.
◮ Protection rings: assign subjects and objects to inhabit one
ring in a concentric series numbered 0,1,2,3. If a subject
tries to access an object, compare the rings they occupy (e.g.,
might only allow “outward” accesses; ring number 0 has the
highest protection). Used in OSes and processor hardware, for
integrity assurances.Intermediate controls, continued
◮ Privileges: instead of considering objects, privileges focus on
operations that subjects may perform. Privileges might
include activities like sys admin, mail access, network access
(typically OS-deﬁned). These activities may be considered as
a higher-level of access controls.
◮ Role-based access control (RBAC): instead of considering
subjects, RBAC focuses on roles that a subject (user) may
perform. A role is a collection of procedures at the application
level. Users may have several roles, and may change roles. We
get a hierarchy of access control mechanisms:
Role A collection of procedures assigned to users.
Procedure A controlled operation with a ﬁner grained
meaning than just observe and alter. Operates on
data of particular datatypes.
Datatype Programming-language level abstraction used to
enforce integrity.Security levels
◮ Ideas for multi-level security (MLS) systems originated in
the military. A security level is another kind of security
attribute used to label subjects and objects, to describe
security policies.
◮ Security levels (like protection rings) come with an ordering.
Typical example:
unclassiﬁed ≤ conﬁdential ≤ secret ≤ topsecret.
◮ Ordering can express policies like “no write-down” which
means that a high-level subject cannot write down to a
low-level object. (A user with conﬁdential clearance cannot
write an unclassiﬁed ﬁle: it might contain conﬁdential
information read earlier.)
◮ In practice, more security levels need to be more ﬂexible than
linearly-ordered document classiﬁcations above. We may want
categorizations as well, for example, describing departments or
divisions in an organization. Then individual levels may not be
comparable.Security lattices
◮ A lattice is a set L equipped with a partial ordering ≤ such
every two elements a,b ∈ L has a least upper bound a∨b and
a greatest lower bound a ∧ b. A ﬁnite lattice must have top
and bottom elements.
◮ In security, if a ≤ b, we say that b dominates a. The bottom
level dominated by all others is system low; the top level
which dominates all others is system high.
◮ Lattices were proposed to model MLS policies because they
allow an ordering of security levels such that:
◮ Given two objects at diﬀerent levels a and b, there is a
minimal security level a ∨ b needed to access both a and b;
◮ Given two subjects at diﬀerent levels a and b, there is a
maximal security level a ∧ b for an object which must be
readable by both.An Example Lattice [Gollmann]
A standard construction is to take a set of classiﬁcations H, with a
linear ordering ≤H, together with a set C of categories. Deﬁne a
compartment as a set of categories, and then a security level as a
pair (h,c) where h ∈ H and c ⊆ C. Then the ordering
(h1,c1) ≤ (h2,c2) ⇐⇒ h1 ≤ h2,c1 ⊆ c2 deﬁnes a lattice.
private,{personnel,engineering}
private,{personnel} private,{engineering}
private,{}
public,{personnel,engineering}
public,{personnel} public,{engineering}
public,{}Bell-LaPadula Model (BLP)
◮ BLP (1973) is state machine model designed to model
conﬁdentiality. Permissions use an AC matrix and security
levels. The security policy prevents information ﬂowing from
a high level to a lower level.
◮ Assume subjects S, objects O, accesses A, and levels (L,≤)
as before.
◮ The state set B × M × F captures current permissions and
subjects accessing objects. It has these parts:
◮ B = P(S × O × A) is the set of all possible current accesses.
An element b ∈ B is a set of tuples (s,o,a) indicating that s is
currently performing operation a on an object o.
◮ M is the set of access permission matrices M = (Mso)s∈S,o∈O
◮ F ⊂ LS × LS × LO is the set of security level assignments. An
element f ∈ F is a triple (fS,fC,fO) where fS : S → L gives the
maximal security level each subject can have; fC : S → L
gives the current security level of each subject (st fC ≤ fS),
and fO: O → L gives the classiﬁcation of all objects.Security properties in BLP
Consider a BLP state (b,M,f) where b is the set of current
accesses.
ss-property For each access (s,o,a) ∈ b where a ∈ {read,write},
fO(o) ≤ fS(s) (no read-up).
∗-property For each access (s,o,a) ∈ b where
a ∈ {append,write}, fC(s) ≤ fO(o) (no write-down).
Furthermore, for such an access, we must have
fO(o′) ≤ fO(o) for all o′ with (s,o′,a′) ∈ b and
a′ ∈ {read,write} (o must dominate any other object s
can read).
These two properties describe the mandatory access control policy.
The access control matrix M allows DAC as well.
ds-property For each access (s,o,a) ∈ b, we have that a ∈ Mso
(discretionary access controls are obeyed).
The state (b,M,f) is secure if these three properties are satisﬁed.
(Note that BLP’s notion of security is entirely captured in the
current state).Current clearance level
◮ Unfortunately, the ∗-property means that there is no way for a
high-level subject to send messages to a low-level subject.
◮ There are two ways out:
1. temporarily downgrade a high-level subject, which is why the
model includes the current clearance level setting fC, or
2. identify a set of trusted subjects allowed to violate the
∗-property.
◮ Approach 1 works because BLP considers the current state to
describe exactly what each subject can know. So if a subject
(think of it as a process) is downgraded, it cannot access
higher-level material, so may safely write at any lower level
than its maximum.
◮ Considering subjects who are people with high-level
clearances, the second approach is more realistic: they may be
trusted to violate the property required of the model, for
example, when deciding to make some part of a secret
document available at a lower level.Basic security theorem
◮ A transition from state v1 to v2 is secure simply if both states
v1 and v2 are secure.
◮ This leads to a rather simple and general theorem:
Basic security theorem. If all state transitions in a
system are secure and the initial state of the system
is secure, then every subsequent state is also secure.
(NB: this follows immediately by induction on the length of
transitions, it has nothing to do with the properties of BLP!)
◮ So a system is secure according to BLP, if the initial state of
the system is secure, and if all transitions it may execute
preserve security.
◮ The point is that we can reduce checking the system for all
possible inputs, to checking that each kind of state transition
which may occur preserves security. Of course, to do this we
need a concrete instance of the model which describes the
transitions that may happen.Other security models
◮ As part of the Multics project which inspired much security
research, BLP has been hugely inﬂuential. But it certainly
does not cover all aspects of security (it wasn’t intended to).
◮ Criticisms against BLP:
◮ it doesn’t address management of access control
◮ it only deals with conﬁdentiality, not integrity
◮ it contains covert channels
◮ A covert channel is an (unintended) information ﬂow that is
not controlled by a security mechanism. Such a channel can
be used to subvert security, by allowing a high-level subject to
communicate directly with a low-level subject. Object names
are a blatant example if a low-level entity can see the names
and is only denied access. Other examples are more insidious
(e.g., hiding a bit of information in a “random” session key),
and ultimately very diﬃcult to prevent.Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman Model
◮ The HRU model (1976) captures the notion of changing
access rights, and adding and removing subjects and objects.
◮ It deﬁnes authorization systems using a language of
primitive operations for manipulating a state (S,O,M).
Commands are guarded sequences of operations, which model,
for example, the creation of a ﬁle by a subject. These are the
state transitions of the model.
◮ A security policy in HRU can regulate the allocation of access
rights. The security property for a state M expresses that no
reachable state M′ can allow a command to add an illegal
right r to M′.
◮ Verifying security of an arbitrary M and r turns out to be
undecidable. It is decidable if commands contain a single
operation, or if S is ﬁnite.Clark-Wilson model
◮ The Clark-Wilson model (1987) attempts to capture security
requirements for commercial applications. The authors
contrasted against BLP, focusing on integrity, whereas BLP
addresses conﬁdentiality.
◮ Clark and Wilson take a broad view of integrity, making the
distinction:
internal consistency property of and enforced by system,;
external consistency externally enforced real-world relation
◮ They suggest two mechanisms to maintain integrity:
well-formed transactions: access only by speciﬁc programs;
separation of duties: users must collaborate on changes.
The ﬁrst mechanism is familiar from OOP and abstract
datatypes. The second is also familiar (e.g., using separate
people to implement, test, and certify a system; idea of
book-keeping). As well as double-checking, it means that to
break a system, collusion between more than one person is
needed.Implementations
◮ Security models with MACs were implemented in Multics and
some commercial of Unices (e.g., Data General DG/UX).
◮ In 2000, the NSA introduced Security-Enhanced Linux, an
open-source kernel patch and utilities for Linux, based on their
Flask architecture:
◮ A security server provides policy decisions to object managers
(managing processes, ﬁles, and sockets). Policies describe
security contexts; the security server maps integer security
identiﬁers (SIDs) to security contexts.
◮ Allows policies with Type Enforcement, RBAC, MLS.
◮ A program checkpolicy compiles a policy into a binary form
read at boot-up; a kernel call is provided to update the policy
at runtime.
Added to distributions in 2004. See
http://www.nsa.gov/selinux.
◮ The TrustedBSD project is a related eﬀort for FreeBSD.Where does the trust lie?
◮ We’ve seen trusted principals both in BLP and in protocols.
Something trusted can hurt you, because you trust it blindly.
◮ By contrast, something trustworthy you have decided to
trust, hopefully with good grounds, for some purpose.
◮ A design principle is to limit the trusted portion. Perhaps
with a small security kernel; if it enforces our security policy,
then any code running on top is automatically secure, and
won’t have to be trusted.
◮ Unfortunately, it’s diﬃcult to express high-level security
requirements at lower levels. Instead, the onion model of
protection mechanisms describes each layer (apps,
middleware, OS, kernel, hardware) as trusting the layer below
it, and implementing its own security concepts, controlling
access to the layer below.
◮ The trusted code from top to bottom (on the security critical
path) is known as the trusted computing base (TCB).References
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